One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure by Scott, Austin W., Jr.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 38 Issue 2 Article 1 
April 2021 
One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure 
Austin W. Scott Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 38 Dicta 65 (1961). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
MARCH-APRIL, 1961 DICTA
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
By AusTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*
During 19601 the Colorado Supreme Court decided a total of
fifty-five cases on criminal law,2 including cases relating to viola-
tions of municipal penal ordinances, which violations Colorado now
considers to be crimes.
8
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Limitation on Home-Rule Municipal Power
The Merris case of 1958 held, in one of its two great holdings,
that when a state criminal statute punishes conduct of state-wide
concern, a home-rule city lacks the power to enact a penal ordi-
nance punishing the same conduct; and, conversely, when a home
rule city has enacted a penal ordinance punishing conduct of local
concern, a state statute punishing the same conduct is inapplicable
to such conduct committed within the territorial limits of the muni-
cipality.4 This holding, which precludes the notion of concurrent
state and municipal power over matters which are actually both of
state-wide and local concern,- has required the court to continue dur-
ing 1960 the process of pigeon-holing various types of conduct into
the state-wide category or the local category.6 The following types
of conduct were held or said in 1960 to be of state-wide concern: petit
larceny,7 picketing,8 liquor law violations,9 and malicious mischief.10
Other matters, when done within municipal limits, were held to be
of local concern: reckless driving and careless driving," unlawful
parking,12 speeding, 8 and running a school stop-light.14 In addition,
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1 The cases discussed in this artirle are found in 348 P.2d Vol. 1 through 358 P.2d Vol. 1., plus
Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960), in 358 P.2d Vol. 5.
2 The following reported cases, included in the total number of 55, for one reason or another
contain so little of value as precedent that they are not discussed in this article! Cera v. People, 351
P.2d 271 (Co. 1960); Falcon v. People, 352 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1960); Tague v. People, 352 P.2d 673
(Colo. 1960); Hackett v. Tinsley, 352 P.2d 799 (Colo. 1960); Bates v. Tinsley,' 353 P.2d 76 (Cola.
1960); Garrimone v. People, 355 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1960).
8 One of the two principal matters decided by Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d
614 (1958), noted at 36 DICTA 34 (1959) and 37 DICTA 45 (1960), as further explained by Geer v.
Alaniz, 138 Colo. 177, 331 P.2d 260 (1958), is that the municipal penal ordinance or charter provision
of a home-rule city creates a crime, not a civil wrong, if either (a) there exists a counterpart state
statute punishing the same conduct or (b) the ordinance or charter authorizes imprisonment as punish-
ment. The penal ordinance of a "statutory" municipality (i.e., without home-rule) on principle
must also be a crime in similar circumstances.
4 Canon City v. Merris, supra note 3.
5 Davis v. Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959), recognizing the difficulties inherent in
such an inflexible system, invited the Colorado legislature to enact legislation delegating to home-
rule cities concurrent power to enact penal ordinances dealing with matters which are of both state-
wide and local concern. So far the legislature has not accepted this invitation.
6 Pre-1960 cases had held the following to be of state-wide concern: (1) driving under the in-
fluence, Canon City v. Merris, supro note 3; (2) driving after license revocation or suspension, Davis
v. Denver, supra note 5; (3) speeding on the Valley Highway, a throughway, through Denver, Denver
v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P.2d 688 (1959); (4) hit-and-run driving, People v. Graham, 107 Colo.
202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941). On the other hand, mast traffic violations on city streets (violations con-
cerning speeding, right of way, parking, stop signs, stop lights, one-way streets) were said to belocal in Merris supra.7 Gazotti v. Denver, 352 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960).
8 Golden v. Ford, 348 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1960).
g See Sierota v. Scott, 352 P.2d 671, 673 (Colo. 1960).
10 Aurora v. Mitchell, 357 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1960).
11 Retallack v. Police Court, 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
12 Lehman v. Denver. 355 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1960) (upholding, as against contention that it served
to promote no public interest, a municipal ordinance forbidding parking on private property).
13 Wiggins v. McAuliffe, 356 P.2d 487 (Colo. 1960).
14 Pickett v. Boulder, 356 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1960) (but reversing conviction for defective summons).
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one case assumed without discussion that prostitution and carrying
a concealed weapon were of local concern.
15
B. Limitations on Non-Home Rule Municipal Power
An important 1960 Colorado case deals with the power of a
non-home-rule city (generally called a "statutory" city) to enact
penal ordinances.16 It is clear that (in the absence of legislation not
yet in existence) the power of a statutory city is even more limited
than that of a home-rule city. Like a home-rule city, the
statutory city may not enact a penal ordinance on a matter
of state-wide concern, at least if a state statute covers the area of
conduct in question.'7 But a statutory city, unlike a home-rule city,
may not enact a penal ordinance on a matter of local concern if
the state has such a complete statute on the matter so as to have
preempted the field.18 If, however, there is no state statute on the
matter, or if the state statute leaves a gap, 19 there is non-home-rule
municipal power to fill the void (at least if the matter is of local
concern) ,20 especially if, as in the case of the state statute with a gap,
the state statute expressly or impliedly authorizes the statutory city
to adopt further non-conflicting regulations supplementing the
statute.
21
Doubtless the Colorado Supreme Court's invitation to the legis-
lature to delegate the home-rule cities' concurrent power to deal
with conduct which is of both state-wide and local concern 22 would
apply with equal force to a comparable delegation to statutory
cities.
C. Particular Crimes
1. Murder-Felony-Murder Doctrine.-A and B attempted to
rob X; B, standing in front of X, held a knife at his heart while A,
behind X, hit him over the head with a gun; the shock of the blow
accidentally discharged the gun, its bullet killing B. A, charged with
felony-murder of B (specifically, for accidental death in the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of robbery), urged that the felony-
murder doctrine does not apply when one of two robbers accidental-
ly kills his own confederate rather than the robbery victim or an
15 Mcintosh v. Denver, 355 P.2d 97 (Colo. 1960) (affirming conviction on the ground that the
summons and complaint were adequate).
16 Aurora v. Mitchell, 357 P.2d 923 (Cola. 1960), holding invalid four Aurora ordinances punish-
ing careless driving, failure to report an accident, malicious destruction of public property, and
malicious mischief, in view of various state criminal statutes on the same subjects.
17 Ibid., concerning the offense of malicious mischief, a matter held to be of state-wide concern.
The court did, however, emphasize that the state statute covers the field.
18 Ibid., concerning the offense of careless driving, which was held to be of local concern in
Retallack v. Police Court, supra note 11.
19 Ibid., concerning the offense of failure to report an accident to the police, where the state
statute made no provision preventing the car owner after the accident from removing his car; the
court indicates that a municipal ordinance punishing such removal would be valid.
20 In view of the fact that a home-rule city may regulate in the area of state-wide concern, if
the state has not undertaken to regulate in that area, Canon City v. Merris, supra note 3, it would
seem that a statutory city might also plug a loophole left by a state statute, or left by the state's
failure to enact any statute at all, in the area of state-wide, as well as of local, concern.
21 See Aurora v. Mitchell, supra note 16, concerning the offense of failure to report an accident;
the court indicates that an ordinance provision prohibiting the owner from removing his car after an
accident (a matter not mentioned in the state statute) would have been upheld if it could have been
severed from the invalid portion of the same ordinance. A bill was passed recently giving statutory
cities express power to enact traffic ordinances not conflicting with state statutes. Senate Bill 244
(May 1, 1961).
22 See Davis v. Denver, supra note 5.
23 Early v. People, 352 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1960), upheld the validity of the felony-murder doctrine
under which one may be convicted of murder without the intent to kill.
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interfering policeman or bystander. It was held that there is no
such limitation on the doctrine.24 The case is to be distinguished on
its facts from the much discussed recent Pennsylvania case 2 5 in
which the felony-murder doctrine was held not to apply in these
circumstances: A and B, after robbing X, fled from the scene pur-
sued by police officers, one of whom shot B to death. It was there
held that where the lethal bullet which killed B came from a gun
justifiably fired by a policeman in order to prevent the escape of
the fleeing felons, A did not come under the felony-murder doctrine
so as to be liable for the death of B. In the Colorado case, however,
it was A's own gun which killed B.
Of course, one who is in no way responsible for another's death




2. Homicide-Self-Defense.-Under some circumstances one is
justified in killing another in self-defense. It is well settled law that
in order to take advantage of this defense the killer must reason-
ably believe (though he need not correctly believe) both (1) that
his adversary will, unless prevented, immediately inflict a fatal or
serious bodily injury upon him, and (2) that he must use deadly
force to prevent his adversary from inflicting this harm.27 An honest
but unreasonable belief in these matters will not do.28 The Colorado
statute on justifiable self-defense in homicide cases, though worded
somewhat vaguely, seems to recognize these principles,2 and prior
24 Robbins v. People, 350 P.2d 818 (Colo. 1960). A claimed also that, when he saw that B was
about to kill X, A suddenly and secretly withdrew from the robbery attempt and accidentally shot
A while hitting X in a noble attempt to save X's life; but as this tale was not believed by the jury,
the court had no reason to consider its validity as a defense. Generally, however, a voluntary with-
drawal, to be effective, to relieve one confederate of criminal responsibility for what another con-
federate does, must involve at least a communication to the other of the fact that he is withdrawing;
and it must be done at some point in time before the consummation of the crime is imminent.
25 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958), noted 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 (1958),
overruling Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
26 Smith v. People, 351 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1960), wherein A hit X lightly, and later B hit X hard, in
A's presence, causing X's death. A's conviction of murder on this evidence was reversed because A's
blow did not contribute to X's death and A did not have a common purpose with B to injure or kill X.
27 Perkins, Criminal Law 883-909 (1957).
28 Id. at 884. Conversely, one is not entitled to the defense of self-defense who shoots his
adversary in cold blood with no thought of saving his own life, though it later turns out that his
adversary would in fact have taken his life had he not first fired the fatal shot.
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-15 (1953) is somewhat ambiguous: "If a person kills another in self-
defense it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing that in order to save his own
life or to prevent his receiving great bodily harm the killing of the other was absolutely necessary."
(1) Appear to the defendant himself at the time he kills? (2) Appear to a reasonable man in the
defendant's shoes at the time the defendant kills? (3) Appear to the court at the time of trial? In
the light of the whole history of the defense of self-defense, it must mean number (2).
Note that with the analogous homicide defense of killing to prevent a violent or surprise felony,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-14 (1953) makes it clear that a "bare fear" that another is about to commit
or is committing such a felony will not do; the circumstances must be such as to "excite the fears
of a reasonable person." This section is ambiguous as to whether it refers to justifiable homicide
in self-defense as well a to justifiable homicide to prevent a violent or surprise felony.
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Colorado cases have recognized their applicability.30 But a surpris-
ing 1960 Colorado case 3 1 holds to be misleading and confusing an
instruction on self-defense which tells the jury that the right of self-
defense in a homicide case is based upon what reasonable persons
would do under similar circumstances. The reason given for this
unusual holding seems to be that since the lower animals, who are
not endowed with intellect and reason, act instinctively in self-
defense without first reasoning the matter out, it follows that man,
who can reason, need not use his reasoning powers! Self-defense
thus "is not based on the 'reasonable man' concept," the court con-
cludes. 32 Perhaps, however, this case can be interpreted to mean
something less revolutionary: that one who is under attack cannot
be expected to reason precisely as to the nature and degree of the
impending harm and the need for deadly force to prevent it; as
Holmes, J., once succinctly put it: "Detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.
'33
The same case holds, in more orthodox fashion, that the defense
of self-defense may be available under some circumstances in a
homicide case even though the killer brought on the difficulty him-
self, as where he interjects himself into a mild situation, like an
argument, and then finds that the mild situation has developed into
one of violence in which, to save himself, he must kill his adver-
sary.34
3. Drunk-Driving Death. - A poorly worded but important
Colorado criminal statute35 makes it a felony, with a maximum pun-
ishment of fourteen years' imprisonment, for one, while under the
influence of liquor or drugs, to cause the death of another by dri-
ving an automobile "in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, or
with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or safety."
The difficulty lies in the interpretation to be given these four al-
ternative expressions of negligence. As a matter of ordinary lan-
guage "negligent" implies tort (i.e., ordinary) negligence; "careless"
would seem to imply something less, and "reckless" and "wanton
disregard" something more, than tort negligence. It makes as much
sense for the legislature to express the statue's negligence require-
ment in these alternatives as it would be for the legislature, wish-
ing to impose a 30 mile speed limit in a certain area, to make it a
crime to drive over 30, or 40, or 50,or 60 m.p.h. in that area. At all
events, one would suppose that the lowest common denominator of
the four alternatives (perhaps this should be the word "negligence"
if we construe "careless" to be another word for the same thing)
would do for guilt. Two years ago a Colorado case seemed to hold
that a greater degree of negligence (something called "criminal
negligence") was required to satisfy the statute.3 6 A 1960 case, how-
30 E.g., Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 355, 107 Pac. 274 (1910): "Apparent necessity, if well
grounded and of such a character as to appeal to a reasonable person, under like conditions and
circumstances, as being sufficient to require action, justifies the application of the doctrine of self-
defense to the same extnt as actual or real necessity."
31 Vigil v. People, 353 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1960), reversing a conviction for murder because of this
and other errors in the self-defense instructions.
32 Id. at 84.
33 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). Mr. Justice Holmes, of course, at the same
time recognized that self-defense is based an the reasonable man concept.
34 Vigil v. People, supra note 31.
35 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-10 (1953).
346 Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279 (1958), noted in 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 104 (1958),
and discussed in Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 DICTA 34, 35-37 (1959).
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1961
ever, holds that proof of ordinary (tort) negligence will do if the
indictment or information charges no more than ordinary negli-
gence.37
4. Burglary.-The defendant entered an outside telephone
booth located away from a filling station and was caught in the act
of trying to pry the cover off the coin box. Was his crime the rela-
tively minor one of attempted petit larceny38 or the serious felony of
burglary?3 9 The answer depends upon whether an outside telephone
booth is a "building" within the meaning of the burglary statute.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that it was, so that the defend-
ant's crime was indeed burglary.40 A building, the court said, is "a
structure which has a capacity to contain, and is designed for the
habitation of man or animals, or the sheltering of property." The
modern legislative trend toward extending burglary to include
chicken houses (and outside telephone booths) is the subject of the
following rhetorical question: "What principle of social utility justi-
fies the elevation of theft or attempted theft in such places [i.e.,
places not used for habitation] to the level of one of the most seri-
ous ... felonies?" 4 1
5. Minor Crimes.-One may be guilty of the crime of driving
after revocation of his license although his license, if it had not been
sooner revoked, would have expired before he did his act of driv-
ing.42 One is not guilty of the crime of carrying a concealed weap-
on ("It shall be unlawful ... to wear under his clothes, or concealed
about his person . . . any dangerous or deadly weapon") when one
holds the weapon in his hand and then tosses it into a car.43
6. Insanity as a Defense.-The Colorado test for legal insanity
as a defense to criminal liability, a combination of the right-and-
wrong test plus the irresistible-impulse test, was upheld against an
attack on its validity made upon the ground that it has been out-
dated and should be repudiated in favor of the Durham rule of the
District of Columbia.
44
7. Constitutional Limitations on the Police Power.-A Colorado
criminal statute punishing persons engaged in the employment
agency business who charge more than a statutory fixed fee for
their services was held to take the property of employment agents
without due process of law in violation of the United States and
37 Espinoza v. People, 349 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1960), which explains the Goodell case as follows:
The Goodell information charged that the defendant operated his car in a reckless, negligent and
careless manner, and with reckless and wanton disregard for human life and safety; therefore the
proof must be of the highest degree of negligence alleged. The court in Espinoza then indicates that
if the information should allege that the defendant operated his car "in a negligent manner" (omit-
ting reference to the other three expressions of fault), proof of simple negligence would do.
38 Petit larceny (i.e., larceny where the stolen property's value does not exceed $50) is a mis-
demeanor punishable by a maximum of $300 fine and six months' imprisonment. Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 40-5-2 (1953). There seems to be no Colorado crime of attempt to commit grand or petit larceny,
however, and the Colorado crime of "assault with intent to commit . . . larceny," Colo. Rev. Stot.
§ 40-2-34, would not apply in the telephone booth situation, where no person was assaulted in the
attempt to steal the money from the coin box.
It seems obvious that Colorado needs a general statute creating the crime of attempted crime.
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-3-6 (Supp. 1957) (one to ten years imprisonment) defines burglary as
entering any building, railroad car or trailer" with intent to commit any felony or misdemeanor
therein.
40 Sanchez v. People, 349 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1960).
41 Allen, Book Review, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 401, 410 (1960).
42 People v. Lopez, 354 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1960).
43 McCray v. Denver, 354 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1960).




Colorado Constitutions, and so to be unconstitutional, because the
fixed fee limitation operated in an arbitrary, unreasonable and con-
fiscatory fashion in the light of the modern fact of business life.4 5
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Rules of Criminal Procedure
In 1960 the Colorado Legislature authorized the Colorado
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of criminal procedure to be fol-
lowed in the Colorado courts. The Colorado Bar Association's
Criminal Law Committee, headed by Judge William L. Gobin, has
drafted a proposed set of Rules patterned upon the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure but modified to a considerable extent to fit
existing Colorado practices. The proposed Rules have been submit-
ted to the Colorado Supreme Court for study and hearings thereon.
It seems probable that the Rules, as they may be modified following
such study and hearings, will be adopted in 1961.
B. Jurisdiction
In Colorado the justice, county and district courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases.46 Generally a complaint
in a misdemeanor case is filed in the justice court, and the defend-
ant is thereafter arraigned and tried in that court, where he is en-
titled to a jury trial on demand. Some district attorneys have in the
past followed the custom of dismissing the prosecution (i.e., filing a
nolle prosequi) in the justice court in order to refile the prosecu-
tion in the county court if the defendant exercises his right to de-
mand a jury trial in the justice court. This practice was condemned
45 People v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960). The case involves the use of "constitutional facts"
put in evidence by the emp.oyment agent attacking the constitutionality of the statute to prove
that, because of changed conditions, the statute now imposed a confiscatory burden upon the agencies
in Colorado.
46 One 1960 case involves the question of what is a misdemeanor case for aurposes of justice
court jurisdiction. Joyriding the first time is a misdemeanor, the second time within five years a
felony. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-13-2 (1953). An information which does not allege a prior conviction
of joyriding within five years charges a misdemeanor, over which the justice court has jurisdiction,
even though in fact the defendant may have had such a prior conviction. Luna v. Knutka, 349 P.2d
565 (Colo. 1960).
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by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1960, the court holding that the
justice court does not lose jurisdiction (and so the county court
cannot acquire jurisdiction) when the district attorney dismisses
the case in the former court for an invalid reason; and doing so in
order to refile in another court as a sort of punishment imposed on
the defendant for having the temerity to demand a jury trial is a
prime example of an invalid reason.
47
Colorado has jurisdiction to try a defendant for a Colorado
crime although at the time of his Colorado trial he is serving a prison
sentence imposed by a federal court on account of a federal crime.
4
1
C. Pre-Trial Remedies to Prevent Prosecution
1. Prohibition.-The ancient prerogative writ of prohibition has
sometimes been used successfully by Colorado defendants to pre-
vent a threatened criminal trial-as where the prosecution of his
case is barred by the statute of limitations or by principles of
former jeopardy.4'9 It was used successfully again in 1960 by one
threatened with trial in a court which lacked jurisdiction because
another court of concurrent jurisdiction had earlier acquired juris-
diction over the defendant and the crime.5-
2. Declaratory Judgment.-One who wishes to engage in cer-
tain conduct which a statute or ordinance punishes as a crime may
prudently wish to test its validity before he undertakes to violate
the terms of the statute or ordinance, rather than engage in the for-
bidden conduct and then, when prosecuted, defend on the ground of
the unconstitutionality of the law. In a 1960 Colorado case a
criminal statute purporting to regulate certain business conduct was
held, in a declaratory judgement proceeding brought by a business
corporation affected thereby against the state official in charge of
administering the statute, to be unconstitutionally vague and so
invalid.5'
D. Information Charging a Felony
Some criminal statutes are worded disjunctively to indicate
that the crime in question can be committed by doing one of several
alternative acts, or by having one of several states of mind, or by
using one of several means, or by accomplishing one of several bad
results, or under one of several sets of attendant circumstances.5 2
47 Van Gundy v. O'Kane, 351 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1960), emphasizing the hardship which the dismiss-
and-refile Procedure has on the defendant: the possibility of multiple arrest and confinement for the
same offense; double boil bond expenses; increased attorney's fees.
The court states that there may be valid reasons for dismissing the prosecution, as where the
district attorney believes his evidence too weak to go through with the prosecution. Then if, becouse
of changed conditions, he later believes he can make a successful prosecution, he may ref;e the case
in the original court or in anothr court of concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 284.
48 Gonzales v. People, 354 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1960) (the federal authorities produced defendant
in the Colorado district court for trial for robbery in response to a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum). See also Gonzales v. Horan, 138 Colo. 275, -332 P.2d 205 (1958), noed in 36 DICTA
34, 40 (1959), making the same point concerning the some defendant.
49 See Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 DICTA 34, 41 (1959).
50 Van Gundy v. O'Kane, note 47 supra.
51 Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 356 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960). In this case the briefs disclose that
the defendant state official agreed with the plaintiff corporation not to object to the appropriateness
of the remedy of declaratory judgment in view of the great public interest in the question and to
avoid multiplicity of suits. The court in its opinion made no mention of the appropriateness of the
remedy. It would seem, however, that under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-11-2 (1953) and Colo. R. Civ. P.
57 (b) the remedy is a matter of right with or without the state official's cooperation.
52 A leading case is Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 (1896), where a criminal statute
unished one who does any of these alternative acts: forges a certain document, or causes it to be
orged, or utters it as true, knowing it to be forged.
DICTA
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With such statutory crimes the usual rule is that the accusation
(indictment or information) must not allege such alternative mat-
ters in the disjunctive as worded in the statute, because that would
not properly inform the defendant of the charge against which he
must defend himself, nor enable him to plead former jeopardy if
later charged with one of the several alternative matters.
53 It is
proper, however, for the accusation to allege the alternative mat-
ters in the conjunctive in which case proof of one of the alternatives
will warrant conviction for the crime.
54
The Colorado drunk-driving death statute discussed above 55
punishes one who, while driving under the influence, causes anoth-
er's death by driving carelessly, negligently or recklessly or with a
wanton disregard for human life. A 1960 case holds to be bad an
information charging, in the language of the statute, that the de-
fendant drove his car carelessly, negligently or recklessly or with
wanton disregard for human life.56 The court indicates that it would
have been proper to word the information conjunctively with
"and's" (in which case the proof must be of the highest type of
negligence alleged) 57 or to pick out one of the alternatives (i.e.,
"negligently") and use it alone without the others (in which case
the proof need be only of that type of negligence).
It is difficult to see how a defendant is any better able to defend
himself when charged with driving "carelessly, negligently and
recklessly" than when charged with driving "carelessly, negligently
or recklessly." It is hard to learn how he will be better able to use
the defense of former jeopardy if charged with "and's" instead of
"or's." The trouble with applying the usual rule to the drunk-
driving death statute is that the various alternative expres-
sions of negligence (careless, negligent, reckless) are not really
separate matters but are simply different degrees of the same mat-
ter. Thus "recklessness" is simply greater negligence than "negli-
gence."5 1 In this type of situation it is submitted that the usual rule
-that statutory alternatives must be alleged conjunctively-is not
applicable. If a statute should foolishly 59 make it a single crime to
drive 30 or 40 m.p.h. at a certain place, an information would actu-
ally make more sense if it charged the defendant with going 30 or
40 than if it charged him with going 30 and 40. Making it a crime
to drive carelessly, negligently or recklessly is about the same thing
as this imaginary 30-or-40 speeding crime, for as 40 m.p.h. neces-
sarily includes 30 m.p.h., so does recklessness necessarily include
negligence.
53 Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, 104 (U.S. 1873).
54 Crain v. United States, supro note 49. Thus in People v. Holmes, 129 Colo. 180, 268 P.2d 406
(1954), where the Colorado burglary statute made it a crime to break and enter or to enter without
breaking the appropriate structure with the appropriate intent, and a single count of the information
charged the defendant with breaking and entering and with entering without breaking a certain
aaartment with intent to steal, the information was held properly worded; and the court stated
that proof of either one of the two acts would establish the crime.
55 See supra notes 35-37 and text.
56 Espinoza v. People, 349 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1960).
57 This dictum, given in explanation of the Goodell case, supro note 36, seems inconsistent with
People v. Holmes, supra note 51, where proof of one of the two alternatives was said to be sufficient.
58 As to the difference in degree between ordinary negligence and "criminal negligence" (which
is probably the equivalent of "recklessness" and of "wanton disregard"), see Trujillo v. People,
133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956) (involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence, some-
thing more than ordinary negligence), noted at 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 409 (1956).




E. Complaint and Summons Charging Municipal Violation
It is well settled that a complaint instead of an information
or indictment will do for charging a violation of a municipal penal
ordinance. For municipal traffic violations it is customary for the
police officer who has observed the violation to make out a com-
plaint and summons charging the offense and notifying the violator
to appear in municipal court at a certain stated time. The police
officer need not, of course, be the expert legal draftsman the district
attorney is expected to be. Three 1960 cases dealt with the problem
of the definiteness of the charge in these cases. One, later termed
"the ultimate limit in informality" in connection with prosecution
for municipal violations,6 ° upheld a complaint and summons which
alleged that the defendant at a stated time and place committed a
violation of a numbered city ordinance (i.e., "ordinance No. 823-
5-1") relating to a stated offense (i.e., "prostitution"), notified the
defendant to appear in municipal court, and concluded with a com-
plaint signed by the police officer that he knew or believed that the
defendant had violated the above section of the Denver Municipal
Code.61 Another, which contained about the same amount of detail
except for the lack of the signed statement that the police officer
knew or believed that the defendant committed the violation (and
so perhaps should be called a mere .'summohs" rather than a "sum-
mons and complaint") was struck down as too informal to support
a conviction. 62 A third held that a summons and complaint, to be
valid, need not, in addition to giving the appropriate ordinance
number, also give the date of passage of the ordinance, at least in
the case of a home rule city. 63
F. Plea
In one case the defendant, charged with murder, pleaded not
guilty at arraignment. After the trial jury had been selected and
sworn, the defendant's attorney, having just received a telephone
call advising him that the defendant was subject to epilepsy, moved
to be allowed to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The
trial judge, after first having the defendant examined by a psychia-
trist who found no epilepsy or insanity, denied the request for the
new plea; and the Supreme Court held this action to be no abuse
of the trial court's discretion as to a change of plea after arraign-
ment.
64
In another case it was held that the not-guilty plea is the ap-
propriate manner of raising the "defense" of the unconstitutionality
of the statute setting forth the crime for which defendant is
charged, when a showing of unconstitutionality requires the intro-
duction of evidence of facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice.6 5
60 See Pickett v. Boulder, 356 P.2d 489, 491 (Colo. 1960).
61 McIntosh v. Denver, 355 P.2d 97 (Colo. 1960). The court indicated that, on request, the defend-
ant might be entitled to a further statement of particulars, in view of the brevity of the charge in the
complaint.
62 Pickett v. Boulder, supra note 60.
63 Wiggins v. McAuliffe, 356 P.2d 487 (Colo. 1960).
64 Robbins v. People, 350 P.2d 818 (Colo. 1960), further discussed supra at note 24 and text.
65 People v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960), further discussed supra at note 45 and text.
Note that another Colorado defendant in 1960 successfully before trial raised the defense of
unconstitutionality by invoking the declaratory judgment device. Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Berry, 356
P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960), discussed supra at note 51 and text.
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G. Pre-Trial Discovery and Inspection
While the early common law frowned upon pre-trial discovery
and inspection of the prosecution's evidence by a criminal defend-
ant, the modern American trend, in case law and legislation, has
been in the direction of allowing it to a limited degree.6 The
modern idea is that ascertainment of the relevant facts, rather than
surprise and concealment, should be the aim of the criminal, no less
than the civil, trial. Colorado, however, has been slow to recognize
the trend. In one 1960 case the trial court, in violation of the Colo-
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rado rule against pre-trial discovery and inspection in criminal
cases,6 7 let the defendant, in preparing his defense, inspect his own
books which had been taken from him and were in the hands of the
police. The Supreme Court on writ of error restated its rule against
the doctrine of pre-trial discovery and inspection.68
H. Nolle Prosequi
When A and B are charged jointly with conspiracy to commit a
crime, the prosecution sometimes dismisses the case (or dismisses
one count of the case) against A in order to use A as a witness
against B. In view of the rule of consistency in conspiracy cases,69
does a dismissal as to A require an acquittal of B? The question was
raised by counsel in one Colorado case, but the Supreme Court
properly found it unnecessary to answer it.
70
I. Trial
1. Newspaper Publicity.-One of the difficulties in the way of
affording a fair trial is excessive pre-trial newspaper publicity
about the case and the defendant, which publicity may contain such
damaging information as the defendant's confession or his past
criminal record. The matter is particularly bad, of course, if the
situation is such that the confession or past record is inadmissible in
evidence at the trial, for the jury may, by reason of having read
the papers, thus acquire damaging and inadmissible evidence
against the defendant. One way to combat the prejudicial effect
of pre-trial publicity is to grant a change of venue to another
county where the publicity has been less effective or to grant a
continuance of the trial until the publicity has worn off.7 1 In one
1960 case a newspaper article appearing on the eve of the trial, read
by some of those who became jurors, mentioned the defendant's
four prior felony convictions (a matter which was inadmissible at
the trial). The court held that since the defendant failed to move
for a change of venue or for a continuance, he could not thereafter
object to the newspaper publicity; and since he failed to exhaust his
peremptory challenges, he could not thereafter object to the jurors
who had read the article.7 2
2. Instructions.-The Colorado Supreme Court, after holding
that the trial court's instructions in a murder trial (in which the
evidence showed that the defendant after an argument shot the
victim on a country road leading to town) improperly set forth the
67 E.g., Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135. 162-63, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952) (trial court has no
discretionary power to allow defense inspection of tangible evidence, since it has no such Power
with documentary evidence). The court there concluded: "The doctrine of discovery is therefore a
complete and utter stranger to criminal procedure, unless introduced by appropriate legislation."
6S Mendelsohn v. People, 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960).
69 See Comment, Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 972-74
(1959). Thus if B is charged with conspiring with A (and no other) and A is acquitted at the same
or an earlier or later trial, B's conviction cannot stand. Id. at 973, n. 386.
70 Mendelsohn v. People, supra note 68.
71 As to publicity during trial, the usual device to prevent harmful influence on the jury is to
forbid the jurors to read articles about the case during trial.
72 Parrott v. People, 357 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1960). The jurors who had read the article stated on
voir dire, of course, that they would not be prejudiced against the defendant thereby. That such
a statement by a juryman does not necessarily prove that he will not in fact be influenced, see
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (jurors, not forbidden as in note 71 supra, read
newspapers during trial, including an article containing information of prior convictions, a matter
ruled inadmissible in evidence at the trial; jurors when questioned by the court during trial stated
they would not be influenced; held, trial court eired in not granting motion for a mistrial).
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law concerning the defense of self-defense in homicide cases,73 ad-
vised Colorado trial courts to couch their instructions in the lan-
guage of the statute rather than by paraphrasing the statutory
law. 74 It then gave an example of a proper instruction applicable to
the case at bar taken from three sections of the Colorado statutes
setting forth the defenses of justifiable homicide.75 These sections
include, in addition to self-defense, such matters as justifiable homi-
cide in defense of habitation, property or person from violent or
surprise felony, and defense against violent entry into a habitation
for purpose of assault therein; they include also a special provision
relating to the killing of magistrates, policemen or other public
officers. Is it really good practice to instruct the jury on these mat-
ters which are not in any way involved in the case to be decided?
It would seem that the statutes here contain much too much of
what is irrelevant to the case, for the killing in question had nothing
to do with defending a home, or protecting others from harm, or kill-
ing a magistrate.
Paradoxically, the statutory provisions on justifiable homicide
contain too little on self-defense as well as too much. As an early
Colorado case pointed out, the statutory provisions "do not purport
to state the law on [self-defense in homicide cases] in extenso, or
with any degree of fullness," so that the defendant, in addition, has"a constitutional right to have a lucid, accurate and comprehensive
statement by the court to the jury of the law on the subject of self-
defense from his standpoint."7 6
Another difficulty with merely quoting the applicable criminal
statute to the jury without explanation is that sometimes the
statute is worded so badly or vaguely as to be confusing at best
and downright misleading at worst.77 Thus involuntary manslaugh-
ter is defined as killing another in the commission of a lawful act"without due caution or circumspection" 7 8 -a term very close to the
expression "lack of due care" which is so often used to describe
ordinary negligence. Yet nothing is clearer in Colorado law than
that ordinary negligence will not do for manslaughter, some higher
degree of negligence being required. How would the jury ever
know this unless it was told so in instructions which explained the
statute? Sodomy is defined in a way as to need some explanation to
be intelligible to the average juror.80 And so on with many other
crimes, especially those which were common law crimes and have
been defined in loose fashion in statutes which do not intend any
change in the common law elements thereof.
73 Vigil v. People, 353 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1960), discussed supra at notes 31-34 and text.
74 Id. at 85-86.
75 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-2-13, 40-2-14, 40-2-15 (1953).
76 Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 355, 107 Pac. 274 (1910), reversing a conviction of murder far
failure to give more complete instructions, especially to the effect that the defendant may act on
reasonable but erroneous appearances of danger. It is true that in this case the court did nat quote
what is now Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-15 (1953), but it seems clear that the Colorado Supreme Court
in the Young case would not have been satisfied if it had, for § 40-2-15 does not make at all clear
the point made by the Young case - that reasonable appearances will do for self-defense.
77 That the Colorado Supreme Court will reverse a conviction an account of a confusing instruction
is illustrated by Abeyta v. People, 358 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1960), where, in a prosecution involving con-
viction on circumstantial evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that to warrant conviction "the
circumstances proven must not be consistent with the innocence of the defendant within a reasonable
doubt.
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-4 (1953).
79 See supra note 58.




Lastly, there are some common law principles which are purely
creatures of the courts rather than of the legislature, so that in such




A number of defendants in 1960 complained, for the most part
unsuccessfully, about their sentences. It was held that a municipal
court may properly impose consecutive sentences for separate
municipal penal violations, especially now that violations are con-
sidered to. be crimes.8 2 It is proper to impose a sentence to com-
mence in futuro, as where it is to commence when an earlier sen-
tence has been served.8 3 Now that the trial judge has been given an
option to sentence certain youthful offenders to either the peniten-
tiary or the reformatory,8 4 he may properly send such an offender
with a bad record to the penitentiary. 5 Where a court has such an
option and exercises it in favor of a reformatory sentence, the con-
viction stands as a felony for habitual criminal purposes.8 6
Many municipal penal ordinances provide for a maximum pun-
ishment of ninety days in jail and a $300 fine. Of course, should an
ordinance provide for a more limited penalty such a penaly would
govern.
8 7
In 1960 the Colorado Supreme Court held that it is a violation
of the equal protection of the laws for a law to impose a heavier
penalty upon one who is found guilty after pleading not guilty than
81 E.g., the defense of entrapment.
92 Schooley v. Cain, 351 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1960).
83 Gonzales v. People, 354 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1960) (defendant convicted in Colorado cour
t 
while
serving federal prison term; sentence for Colorado crime to commence at expiration of federal term).
84 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-10-1 (1953), as amended by Colo. Laws 1958, ch. 36.
85 Roy v. Tinsley, 350 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1960).
86 Martinez v. People, 351 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1960), involving the court's discretion as to defendants,
who are under 21, when convicted of robbery, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-1 (1953). The some statute
limits the term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, where the defendant is under 21 "at the time
of conviction," to 10 years. A defendant who is 20 when he robs, but 21 when sontenced, may be
sentenced to more than 10 years in the penitentiary. Moes v. Tinsley, 353 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1960).
87 Berger v. Denver, 350 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1960), where the municipal code's schedule of fines to
be paid by those who admit guilt and use the traffic violations bureau was held (over a vgorous
dissent), partly as a matter of interpretation of the code, partly as a matter of equal protection, to
limit the punishment which could be awarded to one who pleaded not guilty and was convicted after a
trial.
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upon one who pleads guilty.8 During the same year, however, it
held that it is not a denial of equal protection to assess reasonable
costs upon the one who is found guilty after pleading not guilty but
not upon the one who pleads guilty. 9 Doubtless the problem of
criminal penalties is enough different from that of costs so that the
two holdings are not necessarily inconsistent.
K. Evidence at the Trial
A number of Colorado criminal cases naturally involved vari-
ous evidentiary problems,90 but, since matters of evidence are treat-
ed in a separate article,91 these are not discussed here.
L. Procedure to Determine Insanity
The Colorado statute on procedure to determine criminal in-
sanity provides that after a defendant at arraignment pleads "not
guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime" the court must send him to a state mental hospital for
a phychiatric examination into his mental capacity to commit the
crime; and the court may in addition appoint other psychiatrists to
examine the defendant further.92 In one notorious Colorado murder
case an energetic district attorney, immediately after the defend-
ant's arrest (which followed immediately after the killings) and
long before his arraignment and plea, sent two psychiatrists to the
jail to examine the defendant. They told the defendant they were
doctors, but they did not reveal to him that they were giving him
a psychiatric examination until the end of the examination. He then
replied that he supposed they were giving him such an examination.
The two psychiatrists were allowed to testify at the trial, over de-
fense objections, that they had examined the defendant after his
arrest and found him legally sane. This ruling was upheld by the
Supreme Court against defense contentions that the Colorado statu-
tory psychiatric examination after plea is the exclusive type of ex-
amination permissible, and that the examination given the defend-
ant here violated defendant's due process and equal protection rights
88 Ibid., dealing with a legislative low (the municipal code) imposing a greater punishment on
those found guilty than on those who plead guilty. Of course, judges, in exercising discretion as to
sentence within the statutory limits, often take into account the fact that the defendant did, or did
not, put the state to the trouble and expenses of a trial. The Berger case does not touch this problem,
which presumably is not affected by the equal protection clause.
89 Conner v. Municipal Court, 358 P.2d 24 (Cola. 1960).
90 Rueda v. People, 348 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1960) (dealing with what is "recent" possession of
stolen property which, when unexplained, will support a burglary conviction); Miller v. People, 349
P.2d 685 (Colo. 1960) (reaffirming Colorado's rule on admissibility of evidence obtained by uncon-
stitutional police search and seizure); Mendelsohn v. People, 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960) (accomplice's
testimony need not be corroborated, but it must be recieved with caution); Cardozo v. People, 354
P.2d 504 (Colo. 1960) (court-appointed interpreter is not disqualified from giving testimony); Wilson
v. People, 354 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1960) (confession of co-defendant exculpating defendant not admis-
sible as a dying declaration when made three weeks before co-defendant committed suicide);
Crawford v. People, 356 P.2d 435 (Colo. 1960) (evidence of defendant's flight before arrest properly
admitted to show consciousness of guilt, when admitted along with his explanation of his flight);
Johnson v. People, 357 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1960) (laymen may give opinion as to whether defendant was
under the influence); Kostal v. People, 357 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1960) (contains a guide to district attoineys
as to admissibility of evidence of defendant's other related and unrelated crimes); Carter v. People,
357 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1960) (opinion evidence of qualified expert concerning nar~otics admissible);
Parrott v. People, 357 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1960) (prosecution witness's uninvited mention of defendant's
parole officer not reversible error as evidence of other crimes, where defendant did not then and
there object); Aurora v. Mitchell, 357 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1960) (supreme court will not take judicial
notice of municipal ordinance); Gallegos v. People, 13 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 171 (Colo. 1960)
(defendant's confession held voluntary though defendant only 14, not warned, and without counsel;
evidence given at defendant's juvenile delinquency hearing may be reintroduced at his criminal trial
after the case is transferred to the criminal court).
91 See One Year Review of Evidence, DICTA, May-June, 1961.
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-8-1, 39-8-2 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1957).
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and his privilege against self-incrimination."3 The defendant is pe-
titioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, urging that
the procedure involved a violation of the federal constitution's four-
teenth amendment clauses on due process and equal protection. 4
It seems quite clear that the court is right in approving the
somewhat unorthodox procedure used in this case. The statute does
not purport to provide the exclusive method of mental examination.
As to self-incrimination:
A defendant cannot prevent experts from observing
him in jail or in court, or from testifying to an opinion re-
garding his sanity based on such observations. If the de-
fendant voluntarily submits to such examination, the ex-
perts who examined him may testify to the fact, and to
their opinion of his mental condition formed therefrom,
even though defendant's attorney was not notified or his
consent obtained. In some cases evidence of such examina-
tion has been held admissible even when the defendant did
not voluntarily submit, or objected to or resisted the ex-
amination.9
As to due process, there is nothing in this procedure which
would prevent a fair trial; and there is nothing in the conduct of
the district attorney or doctors in conducting the examination
which so "shocks the conscience" as to constitute a due process
violation without regard to unfairness of trial. As to the speed with
which the prosecution acted it may be noted that, other things
being equal, the sooner the examination takes place after the com-
mission of the crime the easier to determine his sanity or insanity
at the time of the crime.96 As to examination in jail rather than at
a hospital it may be noted that because of many recent escapes from
the hospital of Colorado criminal defendants who have been sent
there for mental examination after pleading insanity, a bill in the
1961 Legislature proposes to amend the Colorado statute on hospital
examination so as to permit jail examinations. The psychiatrists say
that most examinations can be conducted in jail about as well as in
the hospital.
M. Newly Discovered Evidence
A motion for a new trial on account of newly discovered evi-
dence that the crime for which the defendant has been convicted
was actually committed by others is properly refused when the
testimony in support of the motion is utterly unreliable.9 7
N. Appellate Review
1. Time Limitations.-The present rule requires the defendant,
in order to obtain a writ of error for review of his conviction, to file
the proper papers9" in the Supreme Court within six months after
93 Early v. People, 352 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1960).
94 As of this date the filing of the petition has not been reported in U.S. Law Week.
95 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, 294.95 (1954), citing many cases.
96 Id. at 338-39.
97 Rueda v. People, 348 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1960).
98 The law is not altogether clear, but it seems that it is not enough to file a proecipe and desig-
nation of parties in the Supreme Court as in civil cases; the record must be lodged in the Supreme
Court within the six months' period. The record, in addition to the accusation, plea, verdict, motion
for new trial, judgment and sentence, may include either an old-fashioned "bill of exceptions" or,
more commonly today, reporter's transcript of the trial proceedings.
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judgment and sentence9 9 (unless perhaps the Supreme Court grants
an extension of time). The present rule applies to those convicted
after April 1, 1955; as to those convicted before that date there is no
time limit.10 0 Thus, in a case involving a 1959 conviction seven
months was held to be too long a time;101 but in the case of a 1947
conviction a twelve years' delay did not warrant dismissal of the
writ of error.
10 2
2. One Review.-A federal case interpreting Colorado criminal
procedural law concludes, no doubt properly, that a Colorado de-
fendant who is entitled to a writ of error as of right in a criminal
case is entitled to but one such writ.
1'9 3
3. Review of Erroneous Acquittal.-If the trial court should,
because of a mistaken view of the law, erroneously dismiss a crimi-
nal prosecution against the defendant or commit error in its instruc-
tions or rulings on the evidence with the result that the defendant
is erroneously acquitted, the state may obtain a review in order to
have the Supreme Court straighten out the lower courts on the
law, though perhaps a new trial of the defendant would constitute
forbidden double jeopardy. 04 As to Supreme Court reviews on be-
half of municipalities from erroneous acquittals in county court for
municipal violations the Colorado law is somewhat more limited
than in the case of state crimes, being limited to questions of valid-
ity and interpretation of the ordinance or charter provision. 0 5
4. Free Transcript for Indigent Criminal Defendant.-Colorado
recognizes, as it must, that due process and equal protection re-
quire the state to furnish an indigent defendant, who has some-
thing which can be reviewed, with a free transcript of the trial pro-
(09 Rule of the Colorado Supreme Court, quoted in Johnson v. People, 140 Colo. 256, 344 P.2d 181(1959).
100 Johnson v. People, supra note 99.
101 Johnson v. People, 357 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1960) (writ of error dismissed).
302 Smith v. People, 351 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1960) (the court heard the case on its merits and reversed
the conviction, without comment on the delay in bringing the writ; the record shows that the people
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the writ because of the long delay).
103 Medberry v. Patterson, 188 F. Supp. 557 (D. Colo. 1960) (defendant, convicted in 1939, obtained
a writ of error in 1939 but the Supreme Court reviewed his conviction without a reporter's transcript;
having had one review, he could not thereafter obtain another).
104 See 2 King, Colorado Practice Methods, §§ 2383, 2389 (1956). The Colorado low is not settled
on the double jeopardy point. Most states would hold it to be double jeopardy but Colorado has an
unusual constitutional provision.
105 People ex rel. Town of Cherry Hills Village v. Cervi, 356 P.2d 241 (Colo. 1960), involvinq the
penal ordinance of a non-home rule municipality and the application of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-36-3
(1953). The case holds that such a municipality which wins in the municipal court but loses in the
county court cannot have Supreme Court review on error unless the county court has misinterpreted
the ordinance or wrongly held it invalid; presumably there con be no retrial if the Supreme Court
finds error.
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ceedings if such a transcript is necessary for an adequate review.10 6
A 1960 Colorado case undertakes to apply this principle to the case
of a man named Medberry convicted of murder in 1939, who had
the great foresight (as few people did in those days)10 7 to request
the trial court to order the county to furnish a free transcript for
purposes of his appellate review. This request was denied, his case
was reviewed in 1940 by the Supreme Court on the basis of
the record minus the transcript, and his conviction was affirmed.
In 1960 Medberry's case was again before the Colorado Supreme
Court, this time on writ of error to review the district court's de-
nial of his 1959 petition for a writ of habeas corpus to which he
claimed he was entitled because of the violation of his right to an
adequate (i.e., upon the transcript) appellate review of his 1939
conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
habeas corpus, 08 principally on the basis of the inappropriateness of
the remedy even assuming a constitutional violation, 10 9 but also
for the reason that Medberry is not entitled to a free transcript. He
is not so entitled because (1) the issue of indigency at the time of
his 1939 request was a debated matter and there was evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion that he was not indigent110 (so
that presumably the matter is res judicata and cannot be relitigated
in 1960); (2) after 20 years' time the transcript is no longer avail-
able; (3) Medberry has not pointed out what prejudicial errors
would appear in the transcript if one were furnished him.
Having now exhausted his state remedies, Medberry applied for
habeas corpus in the federal courts alleging that his federal consti-
tutional fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection
right to an adequate appellate review was violated by Colorado's
refusal to furnish the free transcript on request. The United States
district court held that Colorado had indeed violated Medberry's
federal constitutional right."' The federal court found, at the fed-
eral habeas corpus hearing which developed the facts concerning
indigency, that Medberry was in fact indigent at the time of his
1939 request and 1940 appeal. 1 2 It found that without the transcript
he did not receive an adequate appellate review. It held that one
may be entitled to a free transcript in an appropriate case though he
cannot, without the transcript, remember the details of a trial
twenty years before so as to Din-point the errors the transcript
would reveal. It found that, true enough, the transcript of the 1939
106 In re Patterson, 136 Colo. 401, 317 P.2d 1041 (1957) (if indigent, defendant is entitled to free
transcript or bill of exceptions), following Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). If - because of a
guilty plea, or a failure to make objections at the trial, or to move for a new trial, or to bring
writ-of-error proceedings on time - there is nothing for the Supreme Court to review, the state need
not furnish a free transcript, for it would be a "vain and useless thing" to do so. Kirkendoll v.
People, 138 Colo. 267, 331 P.2d 809 (1958).
107 Medberry in 1939 was seventeen years ahead of the United States Supreme Court's 1956
ruling in Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 106.
108 Medberry v. Patterson, 350 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1960).
109 See infra under heading 0. Habeas Corpus after Conviction.
110 But Medberry v. People, 107 Colo. 15. 108 P.2d 243 (1940), 'which held that the trial court
properly denied the request for a free transcript, mentions nothing of a trial court finding of non-
indigency; instead, the decision was based on the notion, now (since Griffin, supra note 16) known
to be erroneous, that the granting of a free transcript is entirely discretionary with the trial court.
111 Medberry v. Patterson, 188 F.Supp. 557 (D. Colo. 1960). The.State of Colorado has appealed
the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.
112 A federal court when considering whether a state has violated the fourteenth amendment is
doubtless bound by the state court's determination of the underlying facts, but not by its conclusions
drawn from those underlying facts. E.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (federal courts may
conclude, contrary to the state's conclusion, that a confession is "coerced" in violation of U.S. Con-
stitution, on the basis of the underlying facts found by the state and accepted by the federal courts).
Whether a defendant is indigent, like whether a confession is coerced, is an "ultimate fact," which
is a conclusion based on the various underlying facts.
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trial was no longer available, but that the appropriate remedy in
such a case is not to deny any relief but to grant a new trial at
which a new transcript can be prepared.
113
0. Habeas Corpus After Conviction
1. Grounds for Colorado Habeas Corpus Relief. - Colorado
limits habeas corpus for a convicted prisoner to situations where the
trial court which convicted him had no jurisdiction over his person
or over the crime charged or where its sentence was beyond the
limits of punishment allowed by statute.114 It is not an available
remedy in other situations where the Colorado criminal defendant's
federal or state constitutional rights have been violated, even if the
situation is such that the writ of error does not afford an appro-
priate remedy to right the constitutional wrong.115 Thus the in-
digent Colorado criminal defendant who is denied, in violation of
his federal constitutional rights, a timely request for a free tran-
script for purposes of appellate review cannot have Colorado habeas
corpus relief, even though without the transcript his remedy by way
of writ of error is worth little to him.116 On the other hand, almost
all of the cases which reached the Colorado Supreme Court in 1960
on error to review the lower courts' denials of habeas corpus quite
properly, on principle, affirmed the denial, not so much because of
the court's stated reason that habeas corpus is limited to lack of
jurisdiction and excessive sentences, as because the alleged grounds
for habeas corpus relief were such that the writ of error afforded a
perfectly good remedy for the alleged wrong." 7
2. Federal Habeas Corpus for Colorado Prisoners.-The narrow
scope of Colorado post-conviction habeas corpus, together with the
virtual non-existence of the post-conviction remedy of coram nobis
in Colorado criminal cases," 8 means that Colorado affords no post-
conviction remedy for the situations where the Colorado defend-
ant's conviction was obtained in violation of his federal constitu-
tional rights. The result of this unhappy state of affairs is that
Colorado must suffer the embarrassment of having the federal
courts upset Colorado convictions obtained in violation of federal
constitutional rights. In 1959 the United States District Court for
Colorado properly granted federal habeas corpus relief to a Colo-
rado prisoner serving an old kidnaping sentence who had been de-
113The U.S. district court ordered that Colorkdo either (1) provide Medberry with a transcript
of the 1939 trial or its equivalent and a new appeal (actually not a real possibility in view of the
unavailability of the transcript) or (2) give him a new trial, or (3) discharge him from custody.
114 See Scott, Post-COnviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249
(1959); One Year Review of Criminal Low and Procedure, 36 DICTA 34, 44-46 (1959), 37 DICTA 45,
53-54 (1960).
115 Ibid.
116 Medberry v. Patterson, supra note 108.
117Moore v. Tinsley, 351 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1960) (alleging pre-trial arrest without warrant, use of
coerced confession, and improper instructions); Valentine v. Tinsley, 351 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1960) (con-
taining no indication of the petitioner's allegations, except that they were not that the court lacked
jurisdiction or gave an excessive sentence); Sexton v. People, 351 P.2d 842 (Colo. 1960) (alleging
a mistake in the mittimus, which read that the defendant was convicted of the crime of "habitual
criminal"); Bernard v. Tinsley, 355 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1960) (same mistake in mittimus; held that only
relief available on habeas corpus is to amend the mittimus); Hatch v. Tinsley, 352 P.2d 670 (Colo.
1960) (alleging that defendant was not furnished with a copy of the information, nor a list of
prosecution witnesses or prospective iurors, at arraignment; trial record shows that the allegations
are untrue); Burbach v. Tinsley, 354 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1960) (alleging failure of court after defendant's
guilty plea to examine witnesses in aggravation and mitiqation; trial record shows allegations are
untrue); Nickle v. Reeder, 357 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1960) (alleging error in sentence within statutory
limits for the crime).
118 See Scott, supra note 114.
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nied his right to counsel guaranteed him by the due process clause
of the United States Constitution's fourteenth amendment. 119 In
1960 the same court granted habeas corpus relief to a Colorado
prisoner serving a life term for murder who had been denied his
federal constitutional right, as an indigent desiring appellate re-
view, to the free transcript required for an adequate review.12 0 *
It seems obvious that Colorado ought to provide some effective
post-conviction remedy for Colorado prisoners whose constitutional
rights, state as well as federal, are violated and who cannot effec-
tively secure an appellate review of the violation by writ of error.
The proposed Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 12 1 contain such
a post-conviction remedy, drafted and approved by the Colorado
Bar Association's Criminal Law Committee. It is to be hoped that
the new Rules, together with this provision, will be adopted in 1961
by the Colorado Supreme Court. Colorado laws stand in need of
some clearly stated, easily accessible Rules, and in particular of a
Rule creating a post-conviction remedy somewhat broader than the
narrow remedy now afforded to Colorado convicts.
119 Garton v. Tinsley, 171 F. Supp. 387 (D.Colo. 1959).
120 Medberry v. Patterson, 188 F.Supp. 557 (D.Colo. 1960), appeal by the State of Colorado to the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, now pending.
121 See heading A. Rules of Criminal Procedure, supro.
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